Education, 1 3 local public housing authorities continued to segregate projects based on race and to build public housing primarily in nonwhite neighborhoods unless the project was aimed at housing whites. 1 4 The result is that most subsidized housing is located in urban centers, with the small amount of suburban stock confined mostly to nonwhite tracts. 15 
B. The Conflicting Goals of the Fair Housing Act 16
The stated purpose of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) is "to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States."' 7 No Supreme Court opinion precisely defines "fair housing," although the Court has emphasized that racial integration is both important and desirable. 18 There are two views of the goals of the FHA: one, it aims only to eliminate discrimination; 19 and two, it is designed to eliminate discriminaBecause the black population of the central cities had grown enormously during the war years and had continued to increase in the 50s and early 60s, in the larger cities the new public housing would serve a heavily black clientele. In the mores of the times it was therefore put in black neighborhoods. Also in the mores of the times, many of the newer projects were high-rises; costs were to be kept low by putting more and more apartments into taller and taller buildings.
Alexander Polikoff, Gautreaux and Institutional Litigation, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 451, 452(1988) . The legality of segregating housing projects by race was upheld in Favors v. Randall, 40 F. Supp. 743, 747-48 (E.D. Pa. 1941) .
13 347 U.S. 483 (1954) . 14 See infra notes 34-78 and accompanying text. 19 The FHA covers discrimination in the rental and sale of housing between private individuals, as well as transactions in which the state is directly involved (i.e. any form of subsidized housing). Discrimination in the private sphere is often confused with discrimination in the administration of the public sphere because the results are similar: segregation and lower quality facilities for minorities. The discriminatory practices are also similar in form (either a private actor or a state actor tion as a means towards promoting integration. 20 The "antidiscrimination" goal is explicit in the Act; 21 the "integration" goal has been read into it, largely through reference to the legislative history. 22 The cornerstone of the integration argument is the remark by Senator Mondale, the Act's sponsor, that its purpose is to replace the ghettos "by truly integrated and balanced living patterns." 23 It is doubtful that this is a fair reading of the Act. Resurrecting the integration goal from the legislative history, with no explicit mention of this goal in the statute's text, and placing it on a par with the textual anti-discrimination goal, is a questionable hermeneutic enterprise. Moreover, the Supreme Court has indicated that the legislative history is unhelpful in interpreting the FHA, 24 which was passed in an abbreviated session with no committee reports. 25 discriminates against a prospective minority buyer or tenant). By placing subsidized housing in nonwhite tracts, the State reinforces and exacerbates patterns of private discrimination. This Comment addresses the remedying of housing discrimination only to the extent that it occurs in federally assisted housing.
2 0 See Polikoff, supra note 18, at 48. These goals are not entirely independent:
the correlation between race and poverty is borne out of discrimination. Since this discrimination in turn affects where people live, housing assistance programs can affect both how and where people live. This broad view of fair housing was incorporated into federal policy with the Housing Act of 1949, the stated aim of which is "a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family. 22 Senator Brooke, a cosponsor of the FHA, expounded on the Act: "Can we state the proposition any more dearly? America's future ... does not require imposed residential and social integration.... It does not require that government interfere with legitimate personal preferences of individuals; it does require that government protect the freedom of individuals to choose where they wish to live." 114 CONG. REC. 2525 REC. (1968 . For a discussion of "race-conscious housing counseling" in light of the Act's legislative history and subsequent commentary, see Polikoff, supra note 18, at 47-50. The legislative history to the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 , Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (1974 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), indicates Congress's goal of developing urban communities through, among other things, "increased neighborhood diversity." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1279, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974) , reprinted in 1974 U.S.C. C.A.N. 4273, 4449. 23 114 CONG. REc. 3422 (1968 
C. Current Remedial Doctrine as Structurally Discriminatory
Subsidized housing is a theater of the ideal world insofar as Congress, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and local public housing authorities (PHAs) have the unique opportunity to create and maintain, largely immune from the vicissitudes of a racist private market, communities that reflect the legal interpretation of non-discrimination. 26 Thus, government determinations of where to place and permit subsidized housing should be subjected to excruciating examination under the theory that site selection is the state's demonstration of the way the private market should function were it entirely consistent with the FHA and equal protection. [t] he starting point for any site selection procedure is the principle that, all else equal, subsidized housing should be placed in neighborhoods where low-income households would be most likely to live without restrictive zoning or racial discrimination"). Of course, the administration of subsidized housing reflects current public policy, but that policy has leeway only to the extent that it remains within the bounds of the legal doctrine. For example, levels of funding and physical design are primarily policy determinations, but the administration of the funding must not violate constitutional prohibitions against discrimination.
The legal meaning of "discrimination" is still evolving. It was not until 1954, nearly a century after the Equal Protection Clause was added to the Constitution, that the Court recognized that segregation based on race with "equal" accommodations violated the Fourteenth Amendment. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 397 U.S. 483 (1954) Martin Luther King, Jr., W.E.B. DuBois, and many other civil rights leaders have supported a program of integration based on the "contact hypothesis" view that integration leads to greater authentic understanding among the races and a corresponding waning of antagonism based on racial differences. 28 For a long time, civil rights advocates and the courts interpreted this approach to racial harmony to mean that integration was an end in itself, thus assuming that absent discrimination, the social, political, and economic orders would be entirely integrated.
29
Integrating subsidized housing is a valid and necessary means under the FHA to eradicate past discrimination in the public and private housing markets, and this approach to civil rights reform has achieved deeply significant progress towards racial equality. Where, however, the goal of integration is pursued to deny legitimacy to is the prohibition against stigma. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment invalidates state action employing a race-based classification if the scheme implicates a hierarchical view of race in which one or more races are subordinated. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880) (striking down state statute rendering only white males eligible forjury service based on Fourteenth Amendment right to be "exempt[] from legal discrimination implying inferiority in civil society"); Brown v. Board of Educ., 397 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) (declaring that "[s] eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal"); Lovingv. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,11-12 (1967) (finding unconstitutional a state statute prohibiting interracial marriage because it was based on notions of white supremacy and the "integrity of the white race"); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357-58 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (" [R] acial classifications that stigmatizebecause they are drawn on the presumption that one race is inferior to another or because they put the weight of government behind racial hatred and separatism-are invalid without more." (citations omitted)); see also Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (striking down on stigma grounds, among others, the exclusion of women from a prominent community civic organization [Vol. 140:1463 nonwhite community, the anti-discrimination goal of the FHA and equal protection are violated. The project of exploring alternatives to an obsessive remedial focus on integration should not invoke a terrain defined by conservative politics, but instead should take the form of a more sensitive approach to addressing nonwhite concerns. 3 0 If the subsidized housing stage is to be shared by both "anti-discrimination" and "integration," the second goal must yield the spotlight to the first should they conflict.
This Comment argues that judicial remedies that force integration in subsidized housing fail to account for the right of nonwhite tenants to choose not to integrate. 3 1 Forced integration in subsidized housing presumes that in a society free from discrimination nonwhites will choose to live dispersed among whites. 32 This belief itself is discriminatory because it denies legitimacy to nonwhite community, implying that the only proper residential 32 Housing subsidies are unlike other income-related subsidies in that they have been administered to achieve a goal independent of their primary purpose. For example, Medicare and Medicaid enable the purchasing of better health care, food stamps enable the purchasing of more or better food, and welfare is a direct income subsidy. But while housing assistance enables the tenant to "purchase" better housing, it is also used as a vehicle to accomplish the separate goal of integration.
pattern is one where a majority white community prevails over a submerged nonwhite minority.33
The judicially enforced belief that integration, no matter how small the scale on which it is implemented, will eradicate discrimination carries with it racist assumptions about assimilating nonwhites by diluting nonwhite identity through dispersal. This belief assumes that absent pervasive discrimination nonwhites would necessarily choose to live amidst the white majority rather than live among others with whom they share common heritage, values, beliefs, and culture, as many ethnic whites do (e.g., Italians, Jews).
Since Title VIII bans both overt and subtle racism, any remedial measure that contains traces of even subtle racism is invalid. This Comment tracks and reveals these subtle-yet no less invidious and harmful-racist assumptions as they are played out in the judicial treatment of involuntary and voluntary remedies to past discrimination in the administration of federally assisted housing programs.
Section I of this Comment discusses involuntary, or courtimposed, desegregation orders for municipalities found to have maintained a segregated system of subsidized housing by locating housing projects primarily in nonwhite residential areas, or by segregating tenants. This is the most basic manifestation of the 33 Cf Goel, supra note 29, at 391-92. Goel argues that the guiding principle behind a non-discriminatory integration-promoting administration of the Fair Housing Act should be "anti-subjugation." "Anti-subjugation," according to Goel, "holds that 'it is inappropriate for certain groups in society to have subordinated status because of their lack of power in society as a whole. '" Id. at 395 (quoting Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003 , 1007 (1986 ).
Goel's analysis of integration maintenance programs illustrates the necessity of recognizing the legitimacy of minority choice:
Some integration maintenance programs stigmatize those who civil rights legislation was intended to benefit. In the focus on achieving integration, some also cast aside the more important goal of improving housing conditions for members of previously oppressed groups. Finally, some integration maintenance programs show a disregard for the independent pluralistic and political values minority groups can gain by choosing not to integrate.
Id. at 415. Under this "anti-subjugation" analysis, "demand alteration" measures seeking to encourage white entry into nonwhite communities or steering nonwhites away from white neighborhoods are unacceptable, as are ceiling quotas. But two-way "benign steering" measures, employing counseling and financial incentives, as well as "equity insurance" plans to compensate private homeowners for declines in their property values resulting from nonwhite entrance into white neighborhoods, would be permitted.
19921 1471 [Vol. 140:1463 remedial structure that privileges integration over anti-discrimination. Under traditional civil rights analysis wide-scale forced integration would be the cure for these broad-based discriminatory policies. Even accepting this premise, the courts have been halting and considerably restrained in ordering integration. Consequently, the tentative spurts of subsidized housing integration have resulted in tokenism and devaluation of nonwhite community. Section II discusses the courts' pursuit of integration at the expense of anti-discrimination, specifically focusing on their treatment of nonwhite ceiling quotas within projects. This line of cases has carved out a rule that permits such measures if the white community's interest in preventing "white flight" from the areas surrounding the projects is defined broadly. This rule sacrifices the anti-discrimination goal and is highly stigmatizing. Ceiling quotas on nonwhite tenants marginalize nonwhites by implying that the nonwhite population in a "valid community" is always restricted to a minority proportion. This Section argues that even if "white flight" were a sociologically cognizable reaction to nonwhite population dominance, the courts have no business lending legitimacy to the racist fears of whites by constructing myopic legal rules around them.
Section III considers the "integration versus anti-discrimination" calculus in the analysis of site selection for new projects. Regulations promulgated by HUD that prohibit building in areas of "minority concentration" privilege integration to the detriment of critical housing needs within existing nonwhite communities. Although there is a strong presumption in light of history that placing projects in nonwhite areas is motivated by an effort to relegate poor nonwhites (and nonwhites generally) to the geographic and social margins, these regulations, consistent with prior. jurisprudence, effectively dismiss the desire to cultivate nonwhite community as irrelevant. This practice probably reflects the remedial process's inability to accord value to minority voices rather than an active negation of nonwhite choice. Fortunately, the courts have shown a tendency to look beyond traditional remedial analysis: recognizing that nonwhites may desire better housing more than integrated housing, they have generally favored the building of new subsidized housing over strict adherence to the regulations.
I. INVOLUNTARY REMEDIES: JUDICIAL RESTRAINT IN SITE INTEGRATION

A. The Gautreaux Case
In 1966, a group of nonwhite public housing tenants filed suit against the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) and HUD alleging that, in violation of the Fifth Amendment and Title VI, nearly all of the family public housing sites selected by CHA between 1950 and 1965 were located "within the areas known as the Negro Ghetto" in order to "avoid the placement of Negro families in white neighborhoods."
4 The uncontradicted evidence showed that the Chicago system was entirely segregated, "with four overwhelmingly white projects located in white neighborhoods and with 99 1/2% of the remaining family units located in Negro neighborhoods and 99% of those units occupied by Negro tenants."
5
The district court found that almost 100% of potential project sites in white neighborhoods were vetoed compared with 10% of potential sites in nonwhite neighborhoods. Even though the violation appeared to be confined to the city limits of Chicago, the Supreme Court upheld a comprehensive interdistrict remedy that extended throughout metropolitan Chicago and into the surrounding suburbs. Justice Stewart distinguished the then-recent school desegregation case, Milliken v. Bradley, 3 7 which held that there could not be an interdistrict remedy absent an interdistrict violation. He urged flexibility in constructing equitable relief since HUD had violated the Constitution, a 8 the CHA and 4 Gautreauxv. Chicago Hous. Auth., 265 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1967) ; Gautreaux v. Romney, 332 F. Supp. 366 (N.D. Ill. 1971 ), rev'd, 457 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1972 .
Elements of this litigation were still pending as recently as 1990. See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Kemp, 132 F.R. D. 193 (N.D. Ill. 1990 ) (denying petitions to enjoin construction of 101 townhouses to be built on 11 scattered sites, based on unsubstantiated assertion that the neighborhood was already 99% black). The Gautreaux litigation was purportedly terminated in 1981 when CHA, HUD, and the plaintiff class entered into a consent decree. See Gautreaux v. Pierce, 690 F.2d 616, 621-24 (7th Cir. 1982) .
-" Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 288 (1976 Byrne pledged her support to the scattered-site program on the condition that the agreed-upon ratio of units built in white areas to units built in nonwhite areas be reduced from three-to-one to oneto-one.
46
New construction then proceeded so slowly that the CHA was placed in receivership in May 1987. 47 The portion of the order directed at HUD was implemented in a much more effective manner through development of the MARKET ANALYSIS 12 (1970) , which states that the housing market area "usually extends beyond the city limits" and in larger markets "may extend into several adjoining counties"). 49 "Section 8" refers to the provision of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1988) ), that created three new housing assistance programs for low-income families: Existing Housing, New Construction, and Substantial Rehabilitation. Section 8 "Existing Housing" is a demand-subsidy program that provides participating families with "certificates" or "vouchers" with which they can pay rent to private landlords.
housing assistance payment approach to provide two to three hundred units of subsidized housing a year to the Gautreaux plaintiffs; 50 it resulted in aid to 3500 families (over 10,000 tenants) and the relocation of many of them to the suburbs.
1 B. Gautreaux's Legacy
The Supreme Court's sweeping remedy in Gautreaux seemed to open the doors for voluntary implementation of programs like the Gautreaux Demonstration on a nationwide scale. HUD and local PHAs declined the invitation. At the very least, the decision gave the green light to private plaintiffs and the U.S. Attorney to bring suits against local PHAs to remedy segregative site selection through involuntary metropolitan desegregation orders. In the few cases litigating claims of discriminatory site selection, the courts have designed remedies much less extensive than permitted by the Supreme Court in Gautreaux. The orders, which are discussed in this Section, are examples of excessive judicial restraint.
When implemented on a large scale, as with the Gautreaux Demonstration, "scattered site" housing probably achieves some discrimination reduction by means of integration. 52 The very limited scope of the remedies ordered, however, even in cases where the intensity of the violation ranks with that in Gautreaux, creates a perfunctory judicial gesture towards integration that achieves little more than tokenism. 53 The practical result is that
The units must meet federal minimum quality standards, see infra note 152, and rent for less than a market-indexed ceiling. Under Section 8 "New Construction," HUD guarantees private developers of new housing projects that it will subsidize rental payments provided that some or all of the units are made available to low-income households. "Substantial Rehabilitation" operates similarly with respect to owners who agree to renovate existing structures. See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECTION 8 SUBSIDIZED HOUSING-SOME OBSERVATIONS ON ITS HIGH RENTS,
COSTS AND INEQUITIES 1-7 (1980).
50 See Shayne, supra note 47, at 385. 51 See id. 53 The impact on families can be quite severe. Two commentators noted the costs of limited measures of integration:
The social isolation of being greatly outnumbered as a minority resident in a predominantly white suburb could only aggravate the hurt of any racially [Vol. 140:1463 a limited number of participants gain access to the higher-quality municipal services of the suburbs, but the bulk of assisted families remains concentrated in segregated areas and facilities with the judicial role exhausted. Thus, the violation remains substantially without redress, despite the court's having waved its remedial magic wand.
United States v. Yonkers Board of Education 54
The Yonkers case provides the most striking recent example of a blatant and extensive violation of the Fair Housing Act and the Fourteenth Amendment redressed with a small-scale remedy. Yonkers, New York, is substantially segregated. The bulk of the nonwhite population is confined to the southwest portion of the city. Ninety-seven percent of Yonkers's subsidized housing is located in southwest Yonkers. 55 None of the City's twenty-seven subsidized housing projects for families are located in the overwhelmingly white neighborhoods in the east and northwest. 56 The district court found that the city had engaged in over thirty years of intentional discrimination, 57 placing the predominantly nonwhite motivated harassment experienced there and would certainly lessen the willingness of minority groups to move to integrate. 57 The court found that "the desire to preserve existing patterns of segregation has been a significant factor in the sustained community opposition to subsidized housing in... overwhelmingly white areas of the City." Yonkers, 624 F. Supp. at 1371. The court was not greatly concerned with uncovering discriminatory purpose; to this end Judge Sand did not require proof that decisions on site selection were based wholly on race: "[S]uch findings could rarely, if ever, be made." Id; see also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (stating that " [d] etermining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available").Judge Sand noted that, from the perspective of theory, the case presented an unusually difficult challenge for pegging intent because the violation occurred over a 30-year span by a changing group of city family projects in southwest Yonkers and locating the generally white housing projects for the elderly in white areas. 58 Given the scale of the violation, the remedial order was remarkably restrained. The consent decree approved by the district court provided for a core of 200 low-and very-low-income townhouse-style units to be built immediately in the white areas of Yonkers and for a less definite agreement to make "good faith efforts" to foster the private development of another 600 units of "affordable" housing over the next three years. 59 The Second Circuit, in denying Yonkers's challenge to the remedy, recognized that "[tlhe number of units, 200, was hardly excessive in light of the City's agreement with HUD [(the consent decree describing the extent of the violation)] and the existing concentration of 6,566 units of housing, or 96.6% of all of its subsidized housing, in Southwest." 60 If the defect of Yonkers's system lies in its segregation, locating a mere ten percent of its subsidized housing in white areas hardly embarks down the road to meaningful integration. 
United States v. City of Parma 62
The district court in City of Parma found that Parma, the largest suburb of Cleveland, had maintained a "long-standing policy and practice of excluding black persons from residing in Parma in any substantial numbers." 63 Parma violated the Fair Housing Act by officials. See Yonkers, 624 F. Supp. at 1369. He indicated, however, that "when the segregative effect of an action is extreme, or when there is a series of actions having a consistently segregative effect, the inference is stronger that the effect of the actions is intended." Id.
58 Placement of elderly housing projects, "which, unlike subsidized housing for families, tended to be heavily white," provoked far less opposition in the white areas of Yonkers. 63 City of Parma, 504 F. Supp. at 915. Parma had a population of 100,216 of whom 50 residents were African-American. See City of Parma, 661 F.2d at 566. The trial court found that " [t] he proposition that the Cleveland metropolitan area and its "adamant and longstanding opposition to any form of public or low-income housing," specifically the denial of a building permit for a low-income housing development, the passage of a thirty-five-foot residential height restriction ordinance, and the passage of an ordinance requiring voter approval for low-income housing.
64
Among other remedies, 6 " the court required Parma to build 133 units of low-income housing per year, and it appointed a special master to supervise the program.
66 Given HUD's determination that Parma's low-income housing need was 2669 units and that the city currently had none, the order was a measured effort at relief in light of the court's duty "to eliminate, to the extent possible, the discriminatory effects of Parma's [past] actions," 67 especially where
Congress expressly authorized such sweeping relief.
68
The district court explicity recognized the likelihood of political impediments to implementing the remedy, and for this reason set a specific number of units and appointed a special master to Parma became racially segregated solely as a result of associational preferences and economics, and not because of racial discrimination, is refuted overwhelmingly by the evidence in this case." City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. at 1057.
64 See City of Parma, 504 F. Supp. at 915. The court found all these actions motivated by "a racially discriminatory and exclusionary intent and had foreseeable segregative effects." Id.
65
The district court's willingness to fashion an extensive and highly specific remedy highlighted the severity of the violation. One aspect of the remedial order required Parma to advertise itself as an "open community" where "all persons are welcome" and to proclaim that "discriminatory practices which have characterized Parma in the past no longer reflect the attitude of the City and its citizens." Id. Another required all Parma city officials and employees to undergo a mandatory "fair housing educational program." Id. at 918.
66 See id. at 923.
67 Id. at 916.
68 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1) (1988) (establishing that in a suit by a private person injunctive relief includes ordering affirmative action); id. § 3614(d)(1)(A) (establishing that in a suit by the Attorney General, "the court... may award such preventative relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order against the person responsible for a violation of this subchapter"); see also Park View Heights Corp. v. City of BlackJack, 605 F.2d 1033, 1040 (8th Cir. 1979) (noting that a remedial provision of FHA requires fashioning relief to the extent that it will eliminate the discriminatory effects of the violative action). The Parma district court reasoned that the magnitude of Parma's liability has necessitated a remedy which addresses the numerous illegal actions by the Defendant City. The magnitude of the wrong has dictated the magnitude of the remedy, which is, necessarily, broader than remedies in prior housing cases which involved [only] a single discriminatory ordinance and/or the development of a single low-income housing project. City of Parma, 504 F. Supp. at 924. monitor the order. 69 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's findings of fact° and upheld all aspects of the remedy except the requirement that a specific number of units be built and the appointment of a special master.
71
The circuit court gave surprisingly little reason for reversing the setting of a specific number, noting only that "we believe that no particular number should be required at this time, but that a goal of meeting the need for such housing within a reasonable time should be established by the [fair housing] committee." 7 2 The court applied an "exceeding its authority" yardstick for measuring the appropriateness of the remedy. 7 3 Given the facts of the case, the trial court's equitable order should have been found well within this standard. Even if the "housing need" as determined by HUD were 50% too high, the 138 annual units would only satisfy ten percent of Parma's low-income housing deficit.7 4 At this level, it would still have taken ten years to counter the quantitative effects of Parma's discrimination. Likewise, the appointment of a special master has precedent in the Gautreaux case, 7 5 and was subsequent- . See id. The district court found that the Town Commissioners/defendants, in violating the FHA, had bowed to racially motivated public pressure by ordering the town's withdrawal from a multi-municipality housing project, thereby blocking the construction of 50 low-income public housing units in Clarkton. See id. at 1063. The lower court remedy required the town itself (and alternatively, the individual defendants) to construct the 50 units within the town limits whether or not it could obtain federal financing. See id. at 1067. The circuit court modified this part of the order and construed it as "requiring the defendants to take each and every step, short of directly funding actual construction, necessary to facilitate the development of low-rent housing in Clarkton." Id. at 1070. The court reasoned that Clarkton's lack of financial resources made it impractical to undertake the construction on its own. See id. at 1069. Further, the Circuit Court felt that the defendants themselves were "people of good will" but that they were victims of"aggressively mounted public opinion pressure" by " ly ordered and upheld in the remedy to East Texas's segregated public housing system under similar circumstances. 76 The Sixth Circuit's aversion to mandating and enforcing the construction of a specific number of units infuses fatal vagueness into the remedy and invites its frustration.
77
The preceding cases illustrate two points. First, if housing integration is considered by the FHA to be an end in itself, the postGautreaux courts have been extremely slow to implement it on a broad scale, despite being confronted with egregious violations of the FHA and the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, even assuming that large-scale integration could be freed from racist conceptions of what constitutes valid community in order to render it a legitimate goal of the FHA, the token scale of court-ordered integration relative to the magnitude of the violations undermines the assumption. Scattered-site housing in minute quantities is an inefficacious sprinkle of a cure on a massive disease. The idea that even the most minimal dose of integration will benefit nonwhite tenants is inherently discriminatory: small infusions of mostly nonwhite assisted persons into white areas hardly eradicates discrimination where the bulk of assisted persons remains in segregated housing and the few relocated to scattered-site clusters are merely remarginalized by virtue of their systemic isolation. Essentially, the courts in the cases discussed above seem constrained to order integration, no matter how narrow the scope, because they perceive no judicially manageable alternative on the remedial horizon.
78 mandamus denied, Chicago Hous. Auth. v. Austin, 511 F.2d 82, 86 (7th Cir. 1975) . 76 In the East Texas segregation case, the district court appointed a special master "to monitor and report on HUD's desegregation efforts, to study the operation of the publicly funded housing programs in East Texas, and to recommend further action that might be taken as part of a comprehensive remedial decree. (1988) ("There has been a tendency for courts to trim the right to fit the remedy, thus diluting the force of the underlying right .... Political resistance to racial integration is a given; almost every remedy will have to be enforced in the face of hostile opposition."); see also Gene B. Sperling, Judicial Right Declaration and Entrenched Discrimination, 94 YALE LJ. 1741 , 1742 (1985 (arguing that "judges should conceptually and procedurally bifurcate their determination of right and remedy" and formulate remedies so that disputes about remedies do not work to narrow individual rights).
Cf Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theoty
II. VOLUNTARY REMEDIES: THE LEGAL RATIFICATION OF "TIPPING"
"[W]e know of hardly a more suppressive move that governments can take in this society, than to control where we can live. Would any other people in this Country even be thought of as fit subjects for such policies? And, would any other People not raise holy hell at the very thought that they should be shunted around from area to area, in the interests of satisfying white fear that whites will flee an area (or decline to move in)?"
79
Consistent with judicial approval of limited forced integration as the only remedy to discrimination in subsidized housing and the resulting devaluation of the notion of nonwhite community as a legitimate entity has been the reification and validation of the racist dynamic known as "white flight" or "tipping" in subsidized housing jurisprudence. "Tipping" has been defined as the theory that "every community has a 'tipping point,' a specifiable numerical ratio of blacks [and other nonwhite groups] to whites beyond which the rate of white migration out of a transitional area will increase rapidly, eventually yielding a predominantly black community."80 The existence of a "tipping point" is the asserted justification for using ceiling quotas to contain the proportion of nonwhite residents in a project, which prevents the "white flight" that would ensue if the nonwhite population grew to excess.
The proposition is theoretically unsound. It draws upon an anglocentric binary view of ethnicity with whites at one pole and everyone of color (e.g., African-Americans, Hispanics, AsianAmericans, Native Americans 8 l ) at the other. The courts that have considered "tipping" have never challenged the polarity of this view. Social science support for the actual existence of "tipping" is, at best, mixed. 8 2 The most that can be asserted is that white flight may occur to some degree. Justifying minority ceiling quotas in the face of such amorphous information seems irrational. The stigmatization of nonwhites by the acceptance of this proposition is severe.
8 3 Judicial ratification of a concept that is so obviously generated by racist fears cannot be tolerated under equal protec- 593 (1977) (noting that "[t] he primary evil of [segregation is that it has] designedly and effectively marked off all black persons as degraded, dirty, less than fully developed persons who were unfit for full membership in the political, social, and moral community").
84 Under City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), a "strict scrutiny" analysis will invalidate a "benign" race-conscious program that employs a quota, even if a compelling interest is found in redressingpast specific governmental discrimination, because a quotawill always fail the "narrowly tailored" tier of the test. Moreover, the Croson Court dealt with a program that employed an access, not a ceiling quota, and was remedial in the sense that it aimed to benefit minorities. The only persons benefited by a ceiling quota to avoid the "tipping" of a project are whites seeking to discourage their communities from becoming "too black." The assertion that nonwhites are benefited in the long run from the "privilege" of living among whites in a balanced ratio-maintained at the cost of nonwhites waiting longer for subsidized apartments than whites-is patently discriminatory. Yet this is the only rationale for allowing ceiling quotas to retard "white flight" that could possibly survive Croson. The devaluation of nonwhites as desirable neighbors invoked by this justification surely runs counter to Croson's strict aversion to stigma: "Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm." Id. at 493.
SUBSIDIZED HOUSING DISCRIMINATION
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has mandated that the judiciary take a long-run view of a world beyond discrimination to avoid crystallizing racist currents into precedent.
8 5 The courts cannot be institutions that merely react to and therefore reify racist fears. Rather, courts must be moral leaders by granting relief that forges a standard for race relations and does not resign itself to the sorry state of present affairs. 8 6 Even if "white flight" could be articulated definitively by social scientists, it is wholly inappropriate for courts to shape remedies around racist responses, quickening them into concrete law.
A. Tipping and Balancing: The Persistence of the Otero Rule
Two propositions have emerged from the cases discussing the use of ceiling quotas to maintain integration in assisted housing: one, "tipping" and "white flight" are valid considerations in determining the legality of such quotas; 8 7 and two, although strict 91 (1979) , the Court, in the process of holding that Bellwood and various "testers" had standing to challenge the invidious "steering" practices of real estate brokers, lent its imprimatur to "white flight." The Gladstone plaintiffs alleged that the steering of black prospective home buyers toward a neighborhood of mixed racial composition and their white counterparts toward a largely white neighborhood "affect[ed] the village's racial composition, replacing what is presently an integrated neighborhood with a segregated one." Id. at 110. Writing for the Court, Justice Powell reasoned:
The adverse consequences attendant upon a 'changing' neighborhood can be profound. If petitioners' steering practices significantly reduce the total number of buyers in the Bellwood housing market, prices may be deflected downward. This phenomenon would be exacerbated ifperceptible increases in the minority population directly attributable to racial steering precipitate an exodus of white residents.
Id. (emphasis added).
In the school desegregation context, the Second Circuit has expressly recognized "tipping." In Parent Ass'n of AndrewJackson High School v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1979), the court approved a voluntary desegregation plan that placed a 50% ceiling on African-American students attending any formerly white school in order to quell white fears that the school would become all minority. The court reasoned: "Although white fears about the admission of minority students are ugly, those fears cannot be disregarded without imperiling integration across the entire system." Id.
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scrutiny is ostensibly the proper instrument for evaluating these programs, a ceiling quota on minorities can stand where the asserted community interest in not "tipping" is large enough. The cases adumbrate the rule that a community's interest in not being "tipped" can legitimize a ceiling quota for minorities within a housing project if the "community" is defined to encompass the geographic neighborhood surrounding the project, rather than just the project itself.
This Section argues that "tipping" is an impermissible consideration in the judicial calculus and that the stigma engendered by ceiling quotas is so discriminatory and disadvantageous to minorities that it fails miserably under any constitutional affirmative action analysis. The cases in this Section share essentially the same basic facts: the defendants maintained a ceiling quota within a housing project and justified it with the claim that absent such a quota the project or the surrounding area would "tip" and become all nonwhite.
8 8
Otero v. New York City Housing Authority
89 is the grandparent of this line of cases and the only one to permit a minority ceiling quota to stand. Although the courts in the cases following had the opportunity to overrule or directly contradict Otero they have left its core intact, merely distinguishing it.
90
The issue in Otero was whether the New York City Housing Authority's maintenance of a ceiling quota on nonwhites in the rent-up of a new housing project at 720. " Yinger notes that ceiling quotas seem like a costless way of diverting nonwhite demand to maintain an integrated project with a lower proportion of nonwhites. See Yinger, supra note 26, at 303. But, in addition to the moral price, there are economic costs to ceiling quotas: nonwhites must bear the costs of a longer search for housing, they will probably pay more for housing because of the discriminatory frictions in the market; and the areas where the new demand is diverted may exact higher prices as a result of that greater demand. 437 (1980) . In Tasby, civil rights lawyers challenged an allnonwhite school sub-district and the existence of fifty single-race schools outside of the sub-district on the basis that it was possible to desegregate the entire district. Defendants argued that white flight would negate any efforts at desegregation. The trial court held for the defendants, the Fifth Circuit remanded, and the Supreme Court heard oral argument twice before dismissing certiorari as improvidently granted. See Bell, supra note 85, at 295.
in an urban renewal area was justified by the interest in "prevent[ing] racial imbalance in the project and in the surrounding community." 9 1 The Second Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, announcing the supremacy of the FHA duty to integrate over the duty to eliminate discrimination: "The [New York City Housing] Authority is obligated to take affirmative steps to promote racial integration even though this may in some instances not operate to the immediate advantage of some nonwhite persons." 92 This rule is made clearer by translating its negative phrasing: integration is an obligation even though it may operate to disadvantage nonwhites. 93 The discrimination inherent in the devaluation of nonwhite choice is clear in the court's pronouncement that "[t]he affirmative duty.., to promote the policy of fair, integrated housing is not to be put aside whenever racial minorities are willing to accept segregated housing." 94 The implication of this rule is that nonwhites may not legitimately elect to live within predominantly nonwhite communities.
95
In United States v. Starrett City Associates, 96 the Second Circuit, striking down a minority ceiling quota, expressly distinguished but did not overrule Otero. Otero's underlying balancing principle survives Starrett City and the other cases discussed in this Section: where the community interested in capping the number of nonwhite 91 Otero, 484 F.2d at 1128 (emphasis added). HUD had relocated 1852 families, 60% of whom were nonwhite, that had lived in an "Urban Renewal Area" recently acquired by the City. These relocated families were granted first priority in the project being constructed. When the 360 new leases became available, 27% (rather than the expected 4%) of the displaced tenants reapplied for apartments. See id. at 1126. The Housing Authority disregarded its own regulations and preferred white newcomers to nonwhite displaced tenants, creating a 40% nonwhite to 60% white ratio that would have been 80% nonwhite to 20% white without the ceiling quota. See id. at 1128. The district court granted summaryjudgment to the plaintiffs. See Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 354 F. Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y.), rev 'd, 484 F.2d 1122 'd, 484 F.2d (2d Cir. 1973 .
92 Otero, 484 F.2d at 1125. 93 It is interesting to consider the structure of a system that privileges integration absolutely, even where it is maintained by a method tainted by discrimination. Nietzsche elicited the contradictions inherent in any system that maintains itself through precisely the means which it excludes in order to define itself. Another example is the maintenance of a system of "law and order" that excludes violence by means of police and punishment methods that employ violent force. residents is defined broadly enough (i.e. to include the region surrounding the project), it will outweigh the competing interest of nonwhites in not being burdened by stigmatizing quotas. "Starrett City" is a housing project in Brooklyn, New York, composed of forty-six high-rises containing 5,881 apartments that rents almost exclusively to subsidized moderate-and middle-income tenants.
97 Defendant-management maintained a strict racial quota of 64% whites, 22% African-Americans, and 8% Hispanics. 98 The community interest that defendants asserted to justify the quota was "prevent[ing] the loss of white tenants, which would transform Starrett City into a predominantly minority complex."
99 Thus in Starrett City, the community interest was confined to preventing white flight only within the project itself; in Otero, the community interest encompassed the surrounding community, a much broader geographic area.
The Still, the court discerned an urgency in Otero's preservation of a "precarious racial balance" to prevent "the immediate creation of a 'pocket ghetto'" that would "inevitabl[y]" cause "'non-white ghettoization'" of the Lower East Side (a broad geographic area).
4
97 See id. at 1098. 98 See id. African-Americans waited ten times longer than whites for two-bedroom apartments and almost three times longer on average for one-bedroom apartments.
See id. at 1104 (Newman, J., dissenting). 101 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (applying strict scrutiny to invalidate racial quota in school admission plan).
102 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (finding that programs employing racial or ethnic criteria must be narrowly tailored to remedy defects of past discrimination).
1o Starrett City, 840 F.2d at 1103. 1 0 4 Id. (quoting Otero, 484 F. 2d at 1124). The "immediacy" and "inevitability" that Judge Miner refers to is wholly absent from the Otero opinion: Otero found that nonwhite concentration would "eventually" or "further" occur on the Lower East Side of Manhattan. See Otero, 484 F.2d at 1124-25. In addition,Judge Miner's ratification of Otero blatantly outdated and racist language-"non-white ghettoization"-is disturbing. The implication is that wherever nonwhites (whatever the composition
SUBSIDIZED HOUSING DISCRIMINATION
The Starrett City court also tried to distinguish Otero on the ground that Starrett City did not aim "to remedy past racial discrimination or imbalance within the complex." 10 5 The Otero quota, however, did not aim to remedy past discrimination. In addition, the suggestion that Starrett City would be decided differently had its quota been deemed "remedial" misses the point of Fullilove and Bakke's "past discrimination" requirements. As mentioned above, those cases involved quotas aimed to assist, not deter, nonwhite access to a program.
B. The Rule Applied
Although Burney v. Housing Authority 10 6 struck down a quotabased tenanting plan under a strict scrutiny analysis, the court indicated explicitly that the opposite result would have been reached had the community interest side of the balancing equation been defined more broadly. 10 7 The Burney court avoided determining whether the duty to integrate was a compelling governmental interest" 0 8 by finding that the Beaver plan was not narrowly tailored.
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of this vast group) live together a "ghetto" is created.
105 Starrett City, 840 F.2d at 1102. 106 551 F. Supp. 746 (W.D. Pa. 1982) . 107 See id. at 749. The Housing Authority of the County of Beaver, Pennsylvania managed 1040 family public housing units in sixteen projects located in five geographic districts. The Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission filed a formal complaint against the Housing Authority, charging that the Authority maintained projects segregated by race. By consent decree the Authority and the Commission agreed to desegregate the projects. See id. at 749-50. The method adopted was to set a "target racial balance" equal to the ratio of Blacks to whites in the Beaver public housing system as a whole. When a project deviated from the "target racial balance" tenants of the race whose numbers were deficient would be preferred over tenants whose race was in excess of the target ratio. See id. at 750. 10 See id. at 764. The court, however, did draw an analogy to the school desegregation cases, and it disagreed with Otero, arguing that "there is no precedent for the . .. conclusion that the government has a constitutionallyprescribed affirmative action obligation to achieve integration in public housing." Id. at 761 (emphasis in original to distinguish statutory duty imposed by the FHA).
109 See id. at 765. The court reasoned that the five geographic districts were themselves segregated by race, adding:
Applicants for housing are placed on waiting lists for projects located in the district where they reside. Thus, a district with a large black population obviously will have a high percentage of black applicants. The court ignored its strict scrutiny analysis, however, in carving out the persisting Otero exception. The ceiling quota in Burney was predicated on the prevention of tipping solely within the individual projects. 110 The defendants made no claim that the quotas were based on their fear that "white flight" would precipitate in the surrounding community.
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The court then applied the Otero rule: "The Housing Authority... did not meet its burden of proving at trial that any existing integrated communities were in danger of tipping because of the percentage of blacks residing in projects located therein." 112 The court further explained that "the Housing Authority must be cognizant of this distinction between neighborhood.., and public housing project transition." 11 5
The Burney court revealed its acceptance of tipping in being persuaded by the absence of convincing evidence that tipping would have occurred in the Beaver projects. 114 The court took judicial notice of the specious suggestion that "the tipping point is probably considerably higher in low-income housing projects than in residential neighborhoods." 1 15 This suggests that the court would have ruled differently had stronger evidence been presented that tipping would occur in the projects, especially if the defendants had shown that "resegregation in the area would almost surely [have] result [ed] in the absence of an integration ceiling."
The court in United States v. Charlottesville Redevelopment and Housing Authority 1 17 did not even reach a strict scrutiny test in striking down a 50% ceiling quota for African-American tenants in a Charlottesville public housing project. The court realized that throughout the county rather than being concentrated in one [segregated] district. Id. at 765. Thus, if the Authority's paramount concern was rapid desegregation with the least intrusion on the right of nonwhite groups to be free from stigma/ discrimination, the county-wide plan was the obvious solution.
110 The Housing Authority maintained "that the use of a racial access quota [(ceiling quota)] will effectively prevent resegregation by keeping the number of blacksjust below the point at which white exodus from and/or white refusal to reside in particular projects is expected to occur." Id. ceiling quotas "seek[] to remedy past discrimination against blacks ... with more discrimination against blacks," 11 8 that the "unexamined assumption in the Act's legislative history that the principles of nondiscrimination and integration will always... go hand in hand" is misguided, 119 and that underlying the "cataclysmic language [of "tipping" discourse] depict [ing] what may occur if a plan giving preference to white applicants does not continue... lies the implicit suggestion that an all black housing constituency is somehow a more enfeebled community." 120 The court reasoned that when there is a legal and moral conflict between integration and anti-discrimination, "the obligation.., to avoid discrimination must 'trump' [the] obligation to promote integration" whenever ceiling quotas are involved. 1 2 1 Despite the sensitivity of this analysis, the Charlottesville court acquiesced in the Otero/Starrett City rule, affirming the principle that tipping could be a valid justification for upholding a ceiling quota where there is "a threat not simply to the public housing complex but a threat of tipping presented to the entire neighborhood." 122 In the case, however, the interest in promoting white residency was confined to the project itself; it did not encompass the community at large. Therefore, the quota was struck down for lack of a sizable enough asserted interest. 12s The Charlottesville court identified the stigma created by the quotas as the fact that "black applicants for spaces in the public housing projects .. have had to wait considerably longer than white applicants" for vacant apartments. Id. at 462. A prior and more elementary stigmatic injury to the plaintiffs in this action, however, inhered in the structure of the Charlottesville system. There was only one project in Charlottesville, and it was rented entirely by African-Americans until the imposition of the quota. Although there was "both a higher percentage of whites who need public housing [based on income] and a larger absolute number of whites who need public housing than blacks [in Charlottesville] ... that white constituency... [was] thoroughly underrepresented on the lists of applicants for public housing." Id. at 470. Further, there were "limited housing opportunities available to minorities elsewhere [in Charlottesville], due in large part to continued discrimination." Id. at 469 (citation omitted).
The court realized that the manifest reluctance of whites to enter the public housing program reflected a situation where there is an "alleged need [that is] not perceived or even deliberately ignored" by poor whites in Charlottesville. Id. at 470 n.14 (emphasis added). The court suggested that whites in Charlottesville simply "do not perceive public housing as a need or as an option which is viable to them," and it neutralized the racist foundations for their preferences by applying Yogi Berra's 1489 1490 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 140:1463 At first glance, Williamsburg Fair Housing Committee v. New York City Housing Authority 12 4 seems an anomaly in the preceding line of cases. The defendants, managers of a housing project, maintained a 75% white, 20% Hispanic, and 5% African-American ratio within the Bedford Gardens housing project, although only 30% of the applicant pool was white. 125 The defendants justified the quota at trial by arguing that its purpose was to prevent tipping the surrounding area. The court found that the tipping argument was an eleventh-hour justification and was not part of the defendant's actual plan, and, on this reasoning, invalidated the quota.
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Thus, Williamsburg, too, is consistent with the Otero rule.
Despite arguing "surrounding area tipping" as ajustification for a ceiling quota, in City of Shaker Heights v. Shaker Heights Housing Associates the plaintiffs lost. 127 The court invalidated a racial ceiling quota not because of its inherent devaluation of nonwhites as desirable neighbors, but because the court found that "tipping is not a relevant concern" since the surrounding area was already 96% African-American. 128 Although counsel for defendants argued aphorism: "If the people don't want to come out to the ballpark, nobody's going to stop them." Id. This dicta essentially sanctions a system that is stigmatizing with and without quotas. As in Burney, there is a more effective and less stigmatizing remedy to the segregation in the challenged public housing system. Integration could be better achieved by not concentrating all public housing for minorities in one area, especially considering the "limited housing opportunities available ... elsewhere," and also by building among the white community. that the interest in not being tipped extended to the surrounding area, that interest weighed very little in the balancing equation because the white community's interest in holding down the nonwhite population in a predominantly nonwhite area was very small (in fact, it was not even "relevant").
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Shaker Heights illustrates well the racist underpinnings of the tipping concept and highlights its inadequacy as ajudicial standard. The project, Campbell Court, was originally planned to provide housing for elderly tenants. Because elderly low-income housing tenants tend to be white, the parties anticipated that the project would be approximately 75% white and 25% nonwhite. 13 0 After viewing a sign at the construction site and reading about the upcoming groundbreaking, however, 500 applicants signed up of whom 63% were nonwhite. Faced with "segregation" in a project designed to be "integrated," the city sued to enjoin mailing of acceptance letters, requesting an enforced 75-25 white-to-nonwhite quota, which they argued would reflect the "racially balanced" proportions of the city as a whole.
1
The underlying racism in the tipping discourse is evident. The city deems a 75% white project "integrated" and desirable, while a 63% nonwhite project is "segregated" and undesirable. 132 The presumption that nonwhites are the devalued element in the mix is unavoidable. Furthermore, the City's formulation relies on the notion that a concentration of 75% whites in a predominantly nonwhite neighborhood will not cause tipping, because the implicit valuation of white over nonwhite will not lead to any "nonwhite flight." In addition, the idea that properly "balanced" communities must have racial proportions reflective of society as a whole robs nonwhite institutions of any claim to equal footing and relegates them to the margins. The previous Section illustrated how judicial obsession with the goal of integration resulted in treatment of remedies to public housing segregation that sacrificed the anti-discrimination goal of the FHA and equal protection. The discriminatory tipping rationale was sanctioned as a legitimate consideration in the question of how best to achieve integration. The well-meaning goal of integration became discriminatory because the means for achieving it (through consideration of tipping) were inherently discriminatory. This Section explores how, through the process of subsidized housing site selection, the exclusive pursuit of neighborhood integration can inflict discriminatory stigma on nonwhite community.
The first case to consider a challenge to the proposed construction of federally subsidized housing in a nonwhite area was Shannon The plaintiffs were residents of an urban renewal area in Philadelphia who challenged the construction of "Fairmont Manor," an apartment project, claiming that "the location of this type of project on the site chosen will have the effect of increasing the already high concentration of low income black residents in the [urban renewal area]." 13 4 The Third Circuit found that HUD had only minimal procedures in place for considering the effects of housing placement on racial concentration. 1 3 5 It held these procedures to be inadequate and reversed the lower court's dismissal of the complaint, ordering HUD to "utilize some institutionalized method whereby, in considering site selection... it has before it the relevant racial and socioeconomic information necessary for compliance with its duties under the 1964 and 1968 Civil Rights Acts."
136
The Third Circuit's holding in Shannon had the effect of forbidding HUD and local PHAs from locating subsidized housing solely in nonwhite areas. The regulations have two prongs. The first prohibits new projects from being located in an area of "minority concentration," with two exceptions: the project can be built in such an area if there are "sufficient, comparable opportunities" for minority families in white areas, or if the project is "necessary to meet overriding housing needs which cannot otherwise feasibly be met in that.., area."140 The second prong stipulates that a site must "promote greater choice of housing opportunities and avoid undue concentration of assisted persons in areas containing a high proportion of low-income persons."
141
These regulations are too extreme in mandating that HUD avoid nonwhite areas when creating new housing opportunities. While dispersal of subsidized housing into suburban and white areas is essential for expanding the access of assisted tenants to a better social services network, more latitude is needed to enable nonwhites to choose to remain within racially and ethnically unified neighborhoods and to rehabilitate those communities, rather than being forced to abandon them. This is not merely a matter of policy:
had [on] urban blight.... Increase or maintenance of racial concentration is prima facie likely to lead to urban blight and is thus prima facie at variance with the national housing policy.
Id. at 820-21.
138 Id. at 820.
[Vol. 140:1463 legitimacy of the decision of nonwhites to remain in a nonwhite community.
A. Theoretical Underpinnings for "Nonsegregated" Subsidized Housing and the Recognition of Nonwhite Community
History raises a high presumption against nonwhites having chosen any degree of segregation. A remedial system, however, that fails to recognize the distinct and valid cultures of nonwhites by forcing dispersal among the larger white community is itself discriminatory. The trick then, is to acknowledge the reality of discrimination while simultaneously preserving the option of a nonreactive desire for nonwhite communities.
The theoretical framework for such a remedy is what Forman and Calmore call "nonsegregation."
48
Nonsegregation implies both the right of people to remain indefinitely where they are, even if in ghetto areas, and the elimination of restrictions on moving into other areas. Nonsegregation would provide for voluntary ghetto residence, while integration could result in involuntary nonghetto residence. Only white ethnocentrism could lead to the belief that all blacks would want to live in predominantly white areas.
149
Under a nonsegregation analysis the conflicting social science evidence concerning whether nonwhites in general would actually want to remain in nonwhite areas is legally irrelevant. (noting a Detroit survey that indicated 17% of blacks would prefer to live in all-black communities; only 5% preferred a predominantly white community), discussed in Potter, supra note 25, at 1170-71. Compare Ackerman, supra note 82, at 266 ("Recent [1968 and 1969] attitude surveys suggest that a solid majority of black families favor housing integration.") with DERRICK A. BELLJR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAw 536 & n.18 (1980) (arguing that Ackerman's finding "must be viewed with caution" and in the context of the prospect of better housing promised by the integrationist ideal of the post-Brown years). Bell argues further:
Most low-income blacks would prefer better housing close to their present neighborhoods .... To the extent that integration policies... require them to leave a black neighborhood in order to maintain public housing, blacks may be deprived of the liberty to decide where to live, just as they were doctrine of equal protection must be implemented so that genuine choice exists for nonwhites. This is all the more important in the area of subsidized housing, not only for "racial utopia" reasons, 151 but also because integration of subsidized housing plays the peculiar role of restricting choice under the rubric of expanding opportunity: although the anti-discrimination goal of the FHA aims to eliminate racial barriers to mobility, once a tenant elects to receive government housing assistance she or he surrenders the right to choose location freely in exchange for a subsidy. 152 To the greatest degree possible then, subsidized housing programs should be administered in a manner that avoids treading on the right to choose, especially since the tenant is participating in the housing program solely because of his or her diminished bargaining power. The assumption sedimented in the HUD regulations is that an essential ingredient for fair housing, at least in the public sphere, is "whiteness." 15 As has been argued in the school integration under former segregation policies.
Id. at 556 (citing Comment, 5 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 150, 156 (1970) The assumption that even the attaining of academic skills is worthless unless those skills are acquired in the presence of white students illustrates dramatically how a legal precedent... has been so constricted even by advocates that its goal.., is rendered inaccessible, even unwanted, unless it can be obtained through racial balancing of the school population.
19921 1497 [Vol. 140:1463 arena, the legal focus on integration as the only manageable remedy to discrimination has eclipsed the social goal of better housing to the detriment of those in need. 5 4 The injury of this eclipsing is not only strangulation of the delivery mechanisms of housing assistance, but also the privileging of white over nonwhite community.
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B. Judicial Treatment of the HUD Regulations
In almost all of the cases in which the prospective building of a new project has been challenged, claiming a violation of 24 C.F.R.
§ 880.206,156 the courts have made every effort to uphold HUD's approval of the site. Even where the facts indicate that the area is one where minority or assisted persons are concentrated, the courts have found no concentration or have expanded the "overriding need" exception to swallow the rule.
In Business Ass'n of University City v. Landrieu 57 the court found that the prohibition against locating a site in "an area of minority concentration" was not violated, even though a broader definition of the relevant "area" would have resulted in a violation.
Id.
'" See Bell, supra note 85. Bell notes that district courts are willing to order school integration, even over the protests of large numbers of African-American parents preferring educational improvement over racial balance, possibly out of
